German hospitals receive subsidies for investment costs by federal states. Theoretically, these subsidies have to cover the whole investment volume, but in fact, only 50-60% are covered. Balance sheet data show that public hospitals exhibit higher levels of subsidies compared with for-profit hospitals. In this study, I examine the sources of this disparity by decomposing the differential in a so-called facilitation ratio, that is, the ratio of subsidies to tangible fixed assets, revealing to which extent assets are funded by subsidies. The question of interest is whether the differential can be attributed to observable hospital-specific and federal state-specific characteristics or to unobservable factors.
INTRODUCTION
According to the Hospital Financing Act (KHG) from 1972, a dualistic system is applied to ensure the financing of German hospitals. The fundamental idea is the separated financing of running costs and investment costs. Running costs are reimbursed by statutory and private health insurances, while expenditures for capital, that is, investments in buildings and new equipment, have to be financed by the federal states. This dualistic system is justified with the responsibility of the federal states to ensure a sufficient provision of in-patient health care, especially in structural weak areas (Coenen et al., 2012) . This provision has to be warranted by efficient and independently operating hospitals ( §1 KHG).
For many years, German policy makers and health economists believe that there are too many hospitals in the German market and that a fraction of the hospital population may drop out of the market in the forthcoming years (e.g., Augurzky et al. (2015) , (2014)). The reason for a high risk of market exits is a bad financial situation of some hospitals that is reflected in a high probability of default as well as a low level of profitability. Policy makers with the aim of reducing the number of hospitals may deliberately reduce the volume of granted investment subsidies to accelerate this process. A substantial problem in the hospital market is the undercapitalization of hospitals. Because subsidies represent an important component of the capital stock of hospitals, they are essential for the survival of some hospitals. A further reduction in the volume of granted subsidies can be regarded as a serious threat for these hospitals. However, German federal states are obligated to a socalled debt brake at the latest in 2020. Thus, they have to present structurally balanced budgets respecting a zero deficit rule. Because of this debt brake of the federal states, a continual level of granted subsidies cannot be guaranteed in the long run. Therefore, hospitals are obliged to fill this gap with either equity capital or debt capital. Thus, hospitals will not only compete for patients but also for external capital.
According to the law, there should be no difference in the granting of investment subsidies among hospitals in public, private not-for-profit (PNFP) and private for-profit (PFP) ownership. Thus, the legal form of a hospital company should not affect the granting of subsidies (DKG, 2014) . In fact, there are substantial differences in subsidy shares in the balance sheets among ownership types. Publicly owned hospitals exhibit a higher level of subsidies, while privately owned hospitals receive fewer subsidies. A potential discrimination against particular ownership types in the granting process for subsidies may affect the possibility of hospitals to comply with a high level of health care services via ensuring a sufficient level of adequate buildings and providing modern medical-technical equipment. From an economic perspective such a development may compromise an adequate provision of health care services all over the country, because some hospital owners would not be able to make necessary investments.
In this paper, I examine the sources of differentials in subsidy levels between ownership types. The question of interest is to which extent such differentials can be attributed to differences in observable characteristics related to hospitals and federal states or to unobservable factors. This issue has high policy relevance, since policy makers may have an interest whether hospitals with poor financial conditions are facilitated via subsidies. Until now, to my knowledge, no study exists investigating the sources of the differential in subsidy levels among ownership types. Previous studies examining differences between ownership types of German hospitals focus predominantly on the financial sustainability, cost and profit efficiency or the responsiveness to changes in demand for hospital services (Augurzky et al., 2012; Schwierz, 2011; Herr et al., 2011; Herr, 2008) .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the institutional background of subsidies in the German hospital market. An overview of the data and descriptive statistics are provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents the model and explains the decomposition technique. Results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The KHG constitutes the framework for investment subsidies for German hospitals. To fill this framework with content, each federal state assembles a hospital plan and investment programs to schedule the allocation of investment subsidies ( §6 KHG). For that, federal state-specific hospital financing acts exist. Only hospitals affiliated in the hospital plans of the federal states are eligible for investment subsidies.
1 The purpose of use of investment subsidies is exactly defined. Investment payments are bound to the formation of new hospital buildings and the acquisition of hospital-specific commodities like medical-technical equipment, excluding expendable goods. Furthermore, they should cover the costs for restocking goods belonging to the capital assets. Subsidies are paid as an individual or as a lump-sum funding. For an individual funding an application by the hospital is necessary. Individual funding covers costs for new buildings and the acquisition of medicaltechnical equipment with an average economic useful life of more than 3 years. 2 The acquisition of short-term commodities and small building works are financed via annual lump-sum subsidies, whose amount is regularly adjusted to the development of the costs.
The process by which subsidies are obtained by the federal states is quite bureaucratic and associated with administrative burden that may arise during the application process. A hospital seeking for investment subsidies has to announce its need for financial support. Before the formation a new hospital building or the acquisition of new equipment, the hospital has to prepare a detailed application about the planed activity that is scheduled for being subsidized. This application has to be sent to the responsible authority of the federal state. It has to include the time schedule for building measures, all formal licenses, and administrative decisions that are associated with it. Furthermore, it has to be ensured that granted subsidies are earmarked. This has to be documented, and the period of an earmarked use of the new building or equipment has to be determined. The responsible authority has the possibility to release particular obligations on the submitted application of the hospital. After granting of the subsidies, the hospital has to inform the authority in all cases of delay of the building measures, if the building will not correspond to the initial plan or if the costs will change. In each case, the authority has the right to intervene. The completion of building measures has also to be documented by the hospital. At this step, the responsible authority reserves the right to request further documents that are associated with the investment activity.
Within this granting regime, the investments of a hospital should not depend on the number of patients, because the investment subsidies are granted irrespective of the hospital's cases. Thus, this system had no component that takes into account the performance of a hospital. In 2009, the financing scheme of investment costs has been modified with the Reformed Hospital Financing Act (KHRG), introducing a new option of performance-oriented lump-sum subsidy payments starting in 2012. However, the federal states can decide whether they want to grant subsidies performance-oriented or stay with the established granting regime.
Ideally, the volume for investments should be financed towards 100% via subsidies, but in fact, this magnitude is not reached. Actually, about 50% to 60% of investment expenditures are financed by the federal states. The gap in these investment expenditures has to be paid by the hospitals on their own (Augurzky et al., 2010) . Because federal states are obligated to consolidate their balances, medium-term reliefs for hospitals cannot be guaranteed (Lauterbach et al., 2009) . In 1991, the share of KHG subsidies to the hospitals' total revenue amounted to 10%, while this share decreased considerably to 3.6% in 2012 (Augurzky et al., 2014) . The volume of price-adjusted subsidies to hospitals decreased by 38.7% ( 2.3% p.a.) from EUR 4.3 billion in 1991 to EUR 2.6 billion in 2012, as shown in Figure 1 . An even stronger decrease is documented in subsidies per casemix point with an annual decline by 4.1% ( 58.0% in total) from EUR 307 in 1991 to EUR 129 in 2012. In 2009, subsidy payments slightly increased. This increase does not become apparent per casemix point, because the number of cases grew significantly stronger than the amount of paid subsidies. Other than per casemix point, the increase in subsidies in 2009 relaxed the downward tendency in terms of subsidies per hospital and per hospital bed. Because of a decreasing number of hospitals and their bed capacity, the remaining hospitals benefit from relatively higher subsidy payments between 2005 and 2010. However, the level of paid subsidies has continued to decrease since 2010. Moreover, a disparity in granted subsidies between West and East Germany is observable.
3 Until 2010, hospitals in East Germany received relatively more subsidies in terms of subsidies per bed, per hospital, and per casemix point.
Granted subsidies are booked in the so-called special items in the balance sheet of a hospital. A hospital's balance sheet sum is consisted of equity capital, debt capital, and special items, representing the total volume of the capital stock. Hospital-specific accounting rules have to be applied to ensure an accounting entry of subsidies resulting in neither profit nor loss (Havighorst, 2004) . Thus, the reported capital appreciation should not be affected by subsidies. Special items include subsidies from three sources: subsidies from the federal states according to the KHG, grants by other public authorities not associated with the KHG, and earmarked grants by third parties. Figure 2 shows the development of subsidies related to the balance sheet total (subsidy ratio) and to tangible fixed assets (facilitation ratio). The figure on the left-hand side presents the share of subsidies to the total capital stock of hospitals. The subsidy ratio decreased over all ownership types in the period 2005 to 2011. In 2005, about one-half of the capital stock of public hospitals comprised subsidies. Even though this share decreased until 2011, public hospitals still rely on subsidies to a substantial magnitude with 40.1%. Among hospitals in PNFP ownership, the subsidy ratio decreased slightly from 38.7% in 2005 to 35.4% in 2011. PFP hospitals exhibit the largest decrease by 8.2% points to 25.5% during this period. However, the purpose of granted subsidies is covering the costs for restocking tangible fixed assets (e.g., buildings and new equipment). The pure subsidy ratio does not reveal this issue per se, rather subsidies have to be related directly to tangible fixed assets. The ratio of subsidies to tangible fixed assets, a so-called facilitation ratio, shows to which extent assets are funded by subsidies. In 2005, all ownership types exhibit quite high facilitation ratios between 58.4% and 72.6%. Until 2011, the ratios decreased throughout. However, public (62.1%) and PNFP (58.0%) hospitals have higher facilitation ratios than PFP hospitals (42.1%). Even in the subsidy and facilitation ratio, a disparity between hospitals in West and East Germany exists, with higher subsidy and facilitation ratios in hospitals located in East Germany. 4 The residual in the investment expenditures has to be financed either by equity capital or debt capital. Usually, the absent capital has to be acquired via capital markets.
DATA
The main data source used for the empirical analysis is the annually published hospital register by the German Statistical Office. The hospital register comprises about 95-97% of all German hospitals.
5 Further hospital variables are obtained from the Scientific Institute of the AOK (WIdO). Financial data are obtained from the Dafne database that provides information of balance sheets and profit and loss statements of German companies. The assignment of each hospital to the actual hospital chain has been made by the author. Data on regional characteristics are used from the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBSR). The sample is restricted on hospitals that are eligible for investment subsidies according to the KHG. Thus, university hospitals, military hospitals, and hospitals with or without a medical service contract are excluded.
6 Furthermore, purely psychiatric hospitals and day hospitals are excluded from the sample. Finally, the sample includes general (acute care) hospitals affiliated in the hospital plan. The unit of observation is the single hospital. The sample covers 4622 observations for the period 2005 to 2011, representing in total 915 hospitals or 646 hospital balance sheets, respectively. A balance sheet can cover more than only one hospital, because some balance sheets are available on the hospital company level. To ensure accurate standard errors, they will be clustered on the balance sheet level in the empirical analysis.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table I . 7 The variable of interest is the facilitation ratio. Public hospitals exhibit a facilitation ratio of 67.7%, followed by hospitals in PNFP ownership with 62.4%. PFP hospitals have the lowest ratio with 46.8%. As mentioned in Section 2, reported special items cover three sources of grants. It is not possible to extract only subsidies according to the KHG from this variable. Thus, the facilitation ratio also covers grants by other public authorities not associated with the KHG and earmarked grants by third parties. However, because I am not able to distinguish between the three sources of funds, the facilitation ratio can be regarded as an appropriate measure of the general dependence on subsidies. Public hospitals can achieve additional grants from their owners, that is, the community or the county. To capture this issue to some extent, a variable for the economic strength of a county, the lagged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, will be included in the regression model. Countries with a higher GDP exhibit higher tax revenues and are expected to be more able to support their hospitals. It is reasonable to assume that PFP hospitals would fill their need of capital for new investments at capital markets rather than with grants by third parties.
In order to examine the influence of the profitability of a hospital on the facilitation ratio, the lagged earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) margin is included, representing the relation of EBITDA to total revenues. The coefficient of this variable shall reveal in how far less profitable hospitals rely on subsidies. The means of the EBITDA margin show an inverse pattern compared with the facilitation ratio. The lower the facilitation ratio is, the higher the profitability of an ownership group in the previous year. 8 This relation may indicate that more profitable hospitals can cover their investment costs through own retained profits. Further, hospital-specific characteristics are included in the regression equation with a lag of 1 year: the case-mix index (CMI), the baserate, the size in terms of beds, squared beds, and an indicator for the membership in a hospital chain. The CMI of a hospital represents the diversity and clinical complexity in the population of all the patients in the hospital. Thus, hospitals with a higher CMI treat, on average, patients with more complex diseases. The baserate reflects the price level of a hospital. To control for the population density, a dummy variable for the location in a rural area is included.
Besides hospital characteristics, several federal state-specific variables are included. These variables shall control for differences in the solvency and in political factors between the federal states. Lagged information on debt per capita is included in the regression equation. To capture political influences, a lagged indicator variable for a Social Democratic government is included, while a Christian Democratic government is used as the base category. Furthermore, I include a dummy variable for East Germany to control for the disparity between West and East Germany. Finally, year dummies are included to control for time trends.
MODEL
The facilitation ratio Y itd from hospital i in year t is observed with the corresponding classification in ownership types d D fPublic, PNFP, PFPg. Further, characteristics varying over hospitals, federal states, and time are also available. To avoid potential endogeneity concerns, the majority of hospital-specific and federal A. PILNY state-specific variables is included with a lag of 1 year. The facilitation ratio Y itd is explained through the linear model
and EOE itd D 0 for all d . The coefficients of the model can be estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS).
In order to determine to which extent differences in observable characteristics account for differentials in facilitation ratio means a counterfactual decomposition technique as proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) , the so-called Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is applied. A general formulation of this decomposition technique is provided by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . 9 The difference in facilitation ratio means between two groups of ownership types (d D 0; 1) is described as
with the reference vectorˇ that is defined as a linear combination of both coefficient vectorš
The differential R is decomposed in two parts on the right-hand side of Equation (2). The first term is the socalled explained part and can be attributed to differences in the endowments, that is, observable characteristics. The second term of the decomposition, the so-called unexplained part, captures the part of the differential that is attributable to differences in coefficients and potential unobserved factors.
To estimate the decomposition terms, OLS estimates of the coefficient vectors Ǒ d forˇd and ownership type-specific sample means N X d for E.X d / can be used. Therefore, for each group, a separate linear regression model is estimated. Moreover, an estimate for the unknown reference vectorˇ is needed, which implies determining the weighting matrix . In the literature, it has been widely discussed how can be defined (Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; Reimers, 1983) . If one ownership type in the hospital market is 'discriminated' against in the granting of subsidies, and there is no (positive) 'discrimination' of the other ownership types, the weighting matrix is equal to the identity matrix, that is, D I with the consequence thatˇ Dˇd . In this specific case, the differences in observable characteristics either refer to the disadvantage of the ownership type with the lower level of subsidies or the advantage of the ownership type with the higher level of subsidies. Cotton (1988) points out that the undervaluation of one ownership type is associated with the overvaluation of the other. Instead of this unilateral valuation, Neumark (1988) recommends the estimation of a pooled model over both groups that are compared with each other. The estimated coefficients of the pooled model are then used as the reference coefficients, that is
as shown by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . 10 By using the pooled coefficient vector, the pooled model has to be augmented by a dummy variable indicating one of both groups. When the group-specific dummy variable will be neglected, a part of the unexplained part of the differential can be transferred into the explained part. Thus, the explained part can get overstated (Fortin, 2008; Jann, 2008; Elder et al., 2010) .
In order to identify the factors that are associated with differences in facilitation ratio means among ownership types, a detailed decomposition will be provided. It is of interest which part of the differential can be attributed to particular hospital-specific or federal state-specific characteristics. For providing an accurate detailed decomposition, some methodological issues concerning the unexplained part have to be considered. First, if explanatory variables with a continuous distribution do not have natural zero points, arbitrary scaling of these variables can affect the unexplained part Jones (1983) , Jones and Kelley (1984) , Cain (1986) . When a continuous variable is scaled with a constant, the results in the unexplained part will differ, because the intercept of the corresponding variable changes.
Second, the results from the detailed decomposition for categorical variables depend on the choice of the omitted category that serves as the base group Jones (1983) , Jones and Kelley (1984) , Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) , Horrace and Oaxaca (2001) , Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) , Yun (2005) . The coefficients for the included categorical variables quantify differences with respect to the omitted base category. The explained part of the detailed decomposition is not affected by the choice of the base category. However, the change of the base category has an influence on the results for the unexplained part, because the contribution of the categorical variable is altered as a whole. To overcome this problem, Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) recommend a transformation of the coefficients of all categorical variables in the model insofar that the sum of all single categories is restricted to zero. This transformation avoids an omitted base category, because all categories of the concerned variable will be included in the model without the occurrence of multicollinearity. However, I forgo an interpretation of the detailed decomposition for the unexplained part to avoid potential misleading inference.
The differential in facilitation ratios is decomposed for each possible pair of ownership types, that is, public versus PNFP, public versus PFP, and PNFP versus PFP.
11 For each pair of ownership types, three decompositions are conducted taking into account different weighting schemes for the reference vectorˇ , that is,ˇ Dˇ1,ˇ Dˇ0, andˇ Dˇp ooled .
The regression equations are estimated with pooled OLS (POLS) and fixed effects (FE). A limitation by estimating with POLS, in contrast to FE, is that unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account. In the case of FE estimation, time-invariant factors will be eliminated. Hence, the interpretation of time-variant dummy variables differs between POLS and FE. POLS estimates of coefficients such as PNFP and PFP can be interpreted as the effect of the ownership type on the dependent variable per se, while the FE estimates of these coefficients are only interpretable for those hospitals that changed their ownership type towards PNFP or PFP. However, in the context of the research question, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity shall not conflict the estimation with POLS, because the decomposition separates into differences in observable and unobservable factors between ownership types.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is only provided for the POLS estimates, not for the FE estimates. Sufficient variation in the differential is necessary for the decomposition. The differential in the FE estimates does not provide enough variation to obtain reasonable decomposition results, because the majority on variation in the data is eliminated after the demeaning of the variables. Table II . For both, POLS and FE estimates, the EBITDA margin has a statistically significant negative influence on the facilitation ratio. On average, an increase of 1% point in the EBITDA margin in the previous year decreases the facilitation ratio of public hospitals by 1.77% points ( 1:765=100 D 0:01765), holding all other variables constant. The effect for PFP hospitals is smaller ( 1.16% points) and larger for hospitals in PNFP ownership ( 2.06% points). In the FE model, the influence of the EBITDA margin decreases, but the effect remains negative and statistically significant except for PFP hospitals. Hence, hospitals with a higher profitability seem to be less reliant on subsidies. This statement applies equally for all ownership types, even though the magnitude of the effect differs. Private-for-profit hospitals exhibit a 10.0% points lower facilitation ratio compared with public hospitals. The estimated coefficient is even higher in the FE model, but has to be interpreted differently than the POLS coefficient. Hence, when a hospital changed its ownership towards PFP, the facilitation ratio is even 14.1% points lower, all else equal. When controlling for a wide range of characteristics, the difference between public and PFP hospitals remains still substantial. Surprisingly, the size of a hospital seems to have no influence on the facilitation ratio. Even the CMI has no statistically significant effect on the facilitation ratio. Thus, the diversity and complexity of treated patients do not play a role for the subsidy level of hospitals. The baserate, representing the price level of a hospital, has no influence on the POLS estimations. However, the coefficient for the baserate is statistically significant for PFP hospitals in the FE model, indicating that a higher price level is associated with a lower level of subsidies. The membership to a hospital chain has a statistically significant effect in the group of hospitals in PFP ownership, although this negative effect is quite small. The facilitation ratio depends on the economic strength of the corresponding federal state. Thus, the higher the GDP per capita has been in the previous year the higher the level of subsidies in the capital stock.
Regression results

Coefficients of POLS and FE estimations are presented in
Political dynamics also have an influence on the facilitation ratio. When the government in the federal state changed towards the Social Democratic party in the previous year, public hospitals are associated with a 5.1% points lower facilitation ratio.
The disparity between West and East Germany becomes apparent in the coefficients of the dummy variable for East Germany. Furthermore, the decrease of the facilitation ratio over time is confirmed by the coefficients of the year dummy variables.
Decomposition results
Decomposition results for all three pairs of ownership types with the weighting scheme of the pooled coefficient vector as reference vector are shown in Table III. Tables with decomposition results for the other both weighting schemes are provided in the Appendix.
13 Each column contains a pairwise comparison of two ownership groups. The first column presents decomposition results for the pair public versus PNFP. The differential in the facilitation ratio between both ownership types is 5.3% points. Using pooled coefficients as weights, 91.5% of the differential are explained by observable characteristics, that is, the differential would almost vanish to 0.1% points when both ownership types had the same endowments. The decomposition results in both other columns, containing the remaining pairwise comparisons, exhibit another pattern. The differentials for public versus PFP (21.0% points) and PNFP versus PFP (15.6% points) are considerably higher. Differences in observable hospital-specific and federal state-specific characteristics account for 45.6% and 40.7% of the differential. Hence, when both ownership types within each pair had the same endowments, the differential in the facilitation ratio may reduce to 11.4% points and 9.3% points, respectively. The remaining part of the differential cannot be explained by differences in observable characteristics, but can be attributed to differences in coefficients or unobservable factors.
The bottom panel of Table III contains detailed decomposition results for the explained part. For all pairs, the EBITDA margin attributes significantly to the differential. Hence, differences in the profitability between ownership types account to a large extent for the difference in facilitation ratio means. Furthermore, differences in federal state-specific characteristics have an influence on the differential. In particular, debt per capita and the disparity between West and East Germany account for the difference.
On the whole, the majority of the results is robust to the other both weighting schemes, even though few variables in the detailed decomposition differ in their magnitude and statistical significance. To test the robustness of the results, regressions and decompositions were applied for different model specifications. In one robustness check, the CMI and the baserate were omitted, because the exclusion of these variables increases the sample size from 4622 to 5157 observations. The results from this robustness check do not differ substantially from the main results. In a further robustness check, the dummy variable for East Germany is replaced by 15 dummy variables for the federal states in order to control for different level effects between the federal states. In this model specification, the shares of the explained and unexplained part change to some extent, and not all continuous federal state-specific variables are statistically significant anymore. One explanation may be that the federal state dummies capture a part of the variation in the continuous variables. Nevertheless, in this modified specification, differences in the profitability and in federal state-specific characteristics still account to a large amount for the differential in facilitation ratio means.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to explain the differences in facilitation ratio means among the three different ownership types in the German hospital market. To reveal the driving factors that explain the differentials in the facilitation ratio, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was applied. The reported decomposition results in the analysis should be rather considered as correlations than causal effects. The decomposition results show that the majority of the differential in facilitation ratios can be attributed to differences in the profitability of hospitals, measured by the EBITDA margin. Profitable hospitals are less reliant on subsidies, independent of the ownership group. Two explanations are possible: First, hospitals with a higher profitability may less often apply for subsidies according to the KHG. Second, the administration of the federal states itself may grant lower amounts of subsidies to hospitals with good financial conditions. Because of a limited budget of the federal states, the administration may rather support less profitable hospitals.
Furthermore, differences between the federal states account for a significant portion to the differential in facilitation ratios. The amount of debt per capita explains a part of the differential. In addition, the results indicate that political factors seem to have an influence. These findings show that there are certain factors among federal states or their administrations, which are responsible to some extent for these differentials.
For many years, a discussion among policy makers is going on with the claim that there are too many hospitals in the German market and that some hospitals may drop out of the market in the forthcoming years. Policy makers with the aim of reducing the number of hospitals may deliberately reduce the volume of granted investment subsidies to accelerate this process. Therefore, the initial idea of a dualistic financing system would be undermined. Because the federal states are obligated to a debt brake at the latest in 2020, a quick relief for hospitals is not promised. The inadequate provision of investment subsidies makes the access to capital markets to a competition factor. Hospitals with bad financial conditions face higher interests on debt capital, while profitable hospitals benefit from better access to external capital. The current granting regime gives rise to the question whether a reform of the present regime is needed. An entire re-setting on a performance-oriented granting regime may set incentives to a more entrepreneurial behavior of hospitals. So far, there is insufficient transparency in the issue of subsidies according to the KHG. A higher degree of transparency with respect to the granting criteria can be established, because it has to be ensured that political circumstances do not lead to a distorted allocation of subsidies. 
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